

GPTRACKER: A Large-Scale Measurement of Misused GPTs

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Abstract—Large language model (LLM)-powered agents, particularly GPTs by OpenAI, have revolutionized how AI is customized, deployed, and used. However, misuse of GPTs has emerged as a critical, yet largely underexplored, issue within OpenAI’s GPT Store. In this paper, we present the first large-scale measurement study on misused GPTs. We introduce GPTRACKER, a framework designed to continuously collect GPTs from the official GPT Store and automate the interaction with them. As of the submission of this paper, GPTRACKER has collected 755,297 GPTs and 28,464 GPT conversation flows over eight months. Using an LLM-driven scoring system combined with human review, we identify 2,051 misused GPTs across ten forbidden scenarios. Through both static and dynamic analyses, we explore the landscape of these misused GPTs, including the trends, builders, operation mechanisms, and effectiveness. We find that builders of misused GPTs employ various tactics to bypass OpenAI’s review system, such as integrating external APIs, hiding intention in descriptions, and URL redirection. Notably, GPTs activating external APIs are more likely to provide answers to inappropriate queries than other misused GPTs, showing an average 22.81% increase in answer rate in the Illegal Activity scenario. Leveraging VirusTotal, we identify 50 malicious domains shown on 446 GPTs, where 33 are labeled as phishing, 28 as malware, and 2 as spam, with some domains receiving multiple labels. We responsibly disclosed our findings to OpenAI on September 11, 2024, and November 12, 2024. 1,316 out of 1,804 GPTs reported in the first disclosure were removed by September 25. Our study sheds light on the alarming misuse of GPTs in the emerging GPT marketplace and offers actionable recommendations for stakeholders to mitigate future misuse.¹

Disclaimer. This paper includes examples of hateful and disturbing content. Reader discretion is advised.

1. Introduction

Large language model (LLM)-powered agents have recently garnered significant attention from research communities and industry [9], [18], [51]. Unlike conventional LLMs, these agents are augmented with external knowledge bases and tools, enhancing their applicability in the real world. In November 2023, OpenAI introduced *GPTs*, ChatGPT-powered agents that allow users to customize

them for specific purposes, such as providing personalized travel recommendations or designing presentations [30]. GPTs quickly gained popularity with the public. In just two months, over three million GPTs were created [30]. Additionally, companies such as IKEA, Canva, and Khan Academy integrated GPTs into their offerings to enhance more intuitive user interactions [16], [29]. To further facilitate GPT discovery and engagement, OpenAI subsequently launched the *GPT Store*,² a marketplace similar to Apple’s App Store [1] or Google’s Play [4], where users can explore and interact with GPTs directly.

However, not all GPT builders adhere to OpenAI’s usage policies. Within just two days of the GPT Store’s launch, GPTs that violate platform policies began to emerge [8]. In response, OpenAI has implemented multiple measures to regulate the development and interaction of GPTs on its platform [30], [33], [34]. These efforts include a proprietary review process involving both human and automated reviews to prevent the dissemination of misused GPTs, such as those containing fraudulent, hateful, or explicit content. Users are also encouraged to report GPTs for additional review. Despite these efforts, reports suggest that these measures may be insufficient or less effective than expected. Numerous sources indicate that GPTs misused in various ways are increasingly popular on the GPT Store, including those that violate copyright laws, evade AI content detectors, impersonate public figures, or employ jailbreaking techniques to circumvent OpenAI’s policies [10], [19], [48], [49].

Given the massive scale of the GPT Store, the actual landscape of misused GPTs remains largely unknown. Previous studies predominantly focus on measuring the GPT ecosystem as a whole, examining factors such as categories, review rates, and conversation counts of GPTs [43], [61]. Besides, previous studies treat a GPT as the smallest unit for static analysis. Yet, a GPT comprises various internal roles that coordinate through a series of operations to generate responses (as later discussed in Section 2.1). The research community currently lacks tools for dynamically interacting with GPTs and collecting these internal operations, which limits the understanding of the operation mechanisms behind misused GPTs. For instance, Su et al. [43] conducted a manual review of 1,000 GPTs and identified eight misused ones. Such a strategy is not scalable to profile the entire GPT store. Furthermore, certain GPTs may be specifically designed to hide their intentions to evade detection, such as

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1. Our code is available at <https://github.com/TrustAILab/GPTracker>.

2. <https://chatgpt.com/gpts>.

those used in phishing attacks. These GPTs remain largely unprofiled by the community.

Research Questions. In this paper, we aim to fill these gaps by answering the following research questions.

- **RQ1:** What is the landscape of misused GPTs, such as their trends, builders, and configurations?
- **RQ2:** What are the operation mechanisms of misused GPTs, and how effective are they?
- **RQ3:** How can we identify misused GPTs that are deliberately designed to hide their intentions, and what evasion tactics do they employ to avoid detection?

Our Work. In this work, we present the first large-scale measurement study on misused GPTs. To facilitate this study, we introduce GPTRACKER, a framework designed to systematically collect both static GPT metadata from the GPT Store and dynamic flows during interaction with GPTs (as illustrated in Figure 3). To ensure continuous monitoring and tracking of GPTs, GPTRACKER has been running on a bi-weekly basis since March 26, 2024. As of the submission of this paper (November 14, 2024), GPTRACKER has completed 16 rounds of data collection over eight months. In total, we collect 755,297 GPTs and 28,464 flows between March 26 and October 23, 2024. This substantial dataset serves as a solid foundation for our subsequent analysis. We then employ an LLM-driven scoring system and human reviewers to identify misused GPTs, i.e., GPTs that violate OpenAI’s terms and policies directly through their names, descriptions, or conversation starters. This results in 2,051 misused GPTs created by 1,634 builders across ten forbidden scenarios.

For **RQ1**, we conduct static analysis to quantitatively compare misused GPTs to normal GPTs from several dimensions, including their trends, builders, user feedback, and configurations. We find that, while the creation of new GPTs has slowed down, both misused and normal GPTs have continued to receive frequent updates since May 13, 2024, coinciding with the introduction day of GPT-4o and additional tools. Besides, builders of misused GPTs are more likely to configure external APIs than those developing normal GPTs, which has been further confirmed in the following dynamic analysis that integrating external APIs facilitates introducing inappropriate content to GPTs. We responsibly disclosed our findings to OpenAI on September 11, 2024, with 1,804 misused GPTs identified at that time. As of September 25, 1,316 of these reported GPTs had already been removed, and other GPTs are gradually being taken down. Notably, based on our data, this action represents the largest removal of misused GPTs to date. We also observe five builders recreated misused GPTs after OpenAI removed the original ones. We made a second disclosure with newly identified misused GPTs on November 12, 2024, and are currently awaiting confirmation from OpenAI. This highlights the importance of maintaining up-to-date insights and understanding of misused GPTs (see Section 5).

For **RQ2**, we develop a custom browser extension to conduct automated dynamic analysis by prompting misused GPTs with conversation starters provided by GPT builders. Through analyzing flows extracted from these conversations,

we identify four typical patterns of misuse: operating without tools, enabling built-in tools, enabling external APIs, and using both built-in tools and external APIs. We find that 79.91% of the misused GPTs are working without using any tools. However, experiments reveal that misused GPTs that activate tools, especially external APIs, tend to achieve higher answer rates than other misused GPTs. For instance, compared to misused GPTs without using tools, misused GPTs that activate external APIs in the Illegal Activity scenario show an average increase in answer ratio by 22.81% (see Section 6).

For **RQ3**, we perform a thorough security scan on all GPTs through the lens of domain analysis to identify GPTs with hidden intentions. Leveraging VirusTotal [6], we identify 50 malicious domains from 446 GPTs. Among these, 33 domains are labeled as phishing, 28 as malware, and 2 as spam, with some domains receiving multiple labels. Notably, GPTs associated with malicious domains attempt to disguise themselves as legitimate services, such as new trading platforms, successfully evading OpenAI’s review process. We also observe tactics like URL redirection evasion as part of these attack patterns (see Section 7).

Contributions. The contributions of this paper are as follows:

- We develop GPTRACKER, a framework that continuously collects GPTs from the official GPT Store and automates GPT interaction. GPTRACKER provides insights into the evolving ecosystem and a solid foundation for future research on the LLM app store. We are committed to sharing the framework and the dataset.
- We present the first large-scale study of misused GPTs. Through static and dynamic analysis, we measure their trends, builders, operation mechanisms, and effectiveness, revealing the alarming landscape.
- We identify various tactics employed to bypass OpenAI’s review system, offering stakeholders critical insights into current threats. We also provide actionable recommendations to mitigate future misuse.
- We have responsibly disclosed this study to OpenAI. Following this, the platform owner took down thousands of misused GPTs.

Ethical Considerations & Disclosure. Our study involves online data collection on the GPT Store, which could raise legal and ethical concerns. To counter these, first, our study has been approved by our institution’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). In close collaboration with our Data Protection and Management Department, we formulated a data management plan to ensure our study complies with the GDPR [3]. Specifically, our data is securely transferred (SSL) and stored on a server to which only authorized researchers have access. All PII is anonymized before storage. Throughout all steps, only the authors of this paper conduct the annotations, and no external participants are involved. We have also taken utmost care to ensure that our testing does not disrupt services, harm users, or cause any unintentional damage. Specifically, we query GPTs using four registered accounts, strictly adhering to query




Figure 1: An example process of GPT creation and deployment. An adversarial GPT builder customizes a GPT for misuse, e.g., “avoid paying tax,” as shown in conversation starters. The capabilities and actions are referred to as built-in tools and external APIs in this paper. On the GPT interaction page, users can view the GPT’s basic information and builder’s profile.




Figure 2: An example conversation between a user and a GPT.

limitations. We explicitly disable the “improve the model for everyone” setting for all accounts to opt out of model training. According to OpenAI, all interactions with GPT are invisible to the GPT builder and other users [27], ensuring the harmlessness of our queries. We also delete the chat history to minimize the impact on target platforms after each query session. During our experiments, we responsibly disclosed our findings to OpenAI twice. We first reported 1,804 misused GPTs identified on September 11, 2024, and received acknowledgments from OpenAI. As of September 25, 1,316 of these reported GPTs had already been removed, and other GPTs are also gradually being taken down (see Section 5.1). We made a second disclosure with 247 newly identified misused GPTs on November 12, 2024, and are waiting for OpenAI’s response.

2. Background

2.1. GPTs and Their Operation Mechanism

A GPT is a ChatGPT-powered agent that allows anyone to customize it for specific purposes and share it on the GPT Store. Figure 1 illustrates a typical process of GPT creation and deployment. A GPT builder first customizes ChatGPT by setting instructions (system prompt), uploading relevant knowledge files, and activating specific tools. Once the GPT is configured, the builder publishes the GPT in the GPT

Store. Users can later search the GPT Store for relevant keywords and interact with the chosen GPTs.

When a user queries a GPT, it relies on a series of internal roles to generate a targeted and functional response. There are five types of roles in a conversation: user, all, system, assistant, and tool. These roles exchange structured messages, denoted as *flows*, and each flow carries the following fields: sender, recipient, metadata (additional details attached to the flow), content (information being transmitted, e.g., the input parameters for external APIs), unique ID, and parent ID. Here we present a conversation example to better explain each role’s function and the GPTs’ operation mechanism (as shown in Figure 2). The *system* role sets the GPT’s behavior and is therefore always called at the beginning of conversations to initialize the GPT, i.e., the *all* role (1). The *user* role represents the actual user and transfers the query to the GPT (2). The *assistant* role is responsible for interpreting the user’s query, deciding on the next step, and responding to the user. In this case, it invokes a *tool* role, i.e., *weather.api*, and calls the `get_weather()` function (3). The *tool* role then returns structured data from the `get_weather()` function to the *all* role (4). However, this data is in a structured format (e.g., JSON data), which may not be user-friendly. Subsequently, the *assistant* role processes this structured data and generates a more natural language response to the *all* role (5). Since flows also contain their unique IDs and parent IDs, determining their execution order becomes straightforward and can be further constructed as a directed graph, namely *flow graph*, as illustrated on the right side of Figure 2.

2.2. GPT Regulation & Definition of Misused GPTs

OpenAI has made efforts to regulate the development and interaction of GPTs [33], [34]. GPT builders are required to ensure that their GPTs align with OpenAI’s terms




Figure 3: Overview of GPTRACKER.




Figure 4: Number of GPTs in data collection rounds.

and policies [33], [34]. GPTs are not allowed to include profanity in their names, engage in illegal activities, etc. Following the previous study [41], we summarize these requirements in Table 12 in the Appendix, which includes 11 forbidden scenarios: Illegal Activity, CSAM, Hate Speech, Malware, Physical Harm, Economic Harm, Fraud, Pornography, Political Lobbying, Privacy Violation, and Government Decision. Any GPT violating any of these scenarios is considered a *misused GPT* in our paper. Note that we disregard Legal Opinion, Financial Advice, and Health Consultation scenarios mentioned in the previous study, as OpenAI’s guidelines on these areas are becoming obscure in updates and may lead to false positives [34]. To regulate misused GPTs, OpenAI relies on a combination of automated systems, human review, and user reports to identify misused GPTs [34]. However, our study reveals that many misused GPTs are still persisting in the GPT Store.

3. GPTRACKER

As illustrated in Figure 3, GPTRACKER consists of two modules: the metadata collector, responsible for collecting static metadata, and the conversation extractor, which automates dynamic GPT interaction. In the following, we provide a detailed explanation of the two modules and the collected dataset.

3.1. Metadata Collector

The challenge of measuring the GPT Store’s landscape mainly lies in its lack of transparency, as its homepage only displays around 200 featured or trending GPTs. Therefore, the metadata collector utilizes the GPT Store search interface to retrieve GPTs. This brings two benefits. First, all data

are collected entirely from the official GPT Store, rather than from third-party GPT collection websites, thereby avoiding issues such as data loss and delayed synchronization. Second, this enables GPTRACKER to continuously trace the evolving landscape of GPT Store, which, as we demonstrate in Section 5.1, changes frequently. Specifically, the metadata collector uses 10,000 most common English words³ as the search terms and a web crawler powered by Playwright [5] to retrieve each word to the GPT Store search interface and collect the metadata of returned GPTs. GPTRACKER repeats the metadata collection every two weeks to ensure long-term tracking of GPTs. If a previously collected GPT does not appear in the current search round (possibly because the builder has made it private), we proactively visit the URL of the GPT to obtain its status in that round. Until the submission of this paper (November 14, 2024), GPTRACKER has completed 16 rounds of crawling over eight months. The number of GPTs collected has increased from 511,479 on the first crawl on March 26 to 755,297 on the most recent crawl on October 23 (see Figure 4). We refer to all data collected in this step as *GPT metadata* in this paper. The GPT metadata includes various fields, which can be further summarized into four categories: 1) basic information, 2) GPT builders, 3) user feedback, and 4) GPT configurations.

Basic Information. The basic information includes the GPT’s unique ID, name, description, category, creation time, last updated time, conversation starters, and interaction count. Here, conversation starters refer to default prompts provided by the builder to guide new users in understanding how to interact with the GPT, which also helps to understand the intention of the GPT. The interaction count of a GPT represents the total number of interactions between all users and the GPT, which is displayed as strings, like “1M+” or “6K+.” To make the data easier to interpret and analyze, we convert these values to numerical formats, such as “1,000,000” or “6,000.” Besides, benefiting from our routine collection, we can estimate the approximate time a GPT is removed. Specifically, if a GPT remains available in round n but becomes unavailable in round $n+1$, we record the day of round $n+1$ as the *removed round* for that GPT.

Builders. Fields related to builders include unique builder IDs, display names, linked social media accounts (i.e., LinkedIn, GitHub, and X), and domains (each user can link only one domain). Note that the social media accounts and the domain are respectively linked through OAuth verification and DNS record verification, thus ensuring the builder’s ownership. To protect personal information, we anonymize the specific details of the social media accounts, storing only a true or false status indicating whether the authors have provided them.

User Feedback. When users browse the GPT Store, user feedback is an important indicator for deciding whether to interact with a particular GPT. This feedback is mainly reflected through rating scores and the number of ratings each GPT has received. Users can rate any GPT on a 5-level scale of “bad,” “okay,” “good,” “great,” and “excellent.” The

3. <https://github.com/first20hours/google-10000-english>.

average rating is then displayed on the GPT’s introduction page for easy reference.

GPT Configurations. As ChatGPT-powered agents, GPTs rely on customized configurations to enable complex and diverse interactions, such as retrieving knowledge files, browsing the internet, and accessing third-party services. Specifically, a GPT is customized by three configurations: a system prompt, knowledge files, and tools.

- *System prompt* is the prompt set by the GPT builder to instruct the GPT’s behavior. Although the GPT metadata includes this field, it is empty when the accessing account is not the GPT’s builder. We thereby omit this field in the following analysis.
- *Knowledge files* are documents the builder uploads to enhance the GPT’s inherent knowledge, particularly for GPTs designed for specialized areas like medicine or cybersecurity. When a user interacts with such a GPT, it can retrieve these knowledge files to gain additional context to augment the GPT’s response. For each GPT, the builder is allowed to upload up to 20 knowledge files, with each file being up to 512 MB in size and containing a maximum of 2,000,000 tokens [31]. In the GPT metadata, we collect the IDs and types of the knowledge files.
- *Tools* can be further divided into built-in tools offered by OpenAI and external APIs set by the builder. The built-in tools are: 1) Code Interpreter: allows the GPT to write and run code in a sandboxed execution environment; 2) Web Browsing: allows the GPT to access the internet; 3) DALL-E Image Generation: enables image generation. The external APIs connect the GPT to functions from third-party providers, such as searching on a specialized website or purchasing cryptocurrency. While the GPT introduction webpage only shows the tools’ activation status, *GPT metadata* includes the complete configurations of the external APIs in JSON format, such as the titles, descriptions, servers, API paths, and calling methods.

3.2. Conversation Extractor

Since GPTs can only be accessed via the Web interface, we develop a Chrome extension as the conversation extractor to enable automatic interaction with GPTs. Specifically, given a GPT, the Chrome extension automatically obtains its URL from the GPT metadata, visits the page through the browser, logs in with a registered account, and inputs the prompt. Then, the Chrome extension listens to the web socket established between the test account and the GPT to capture the complete flows during the conversation. These flows are structured data constructed by OpenAI, including user-visible prompt-response messages and user-invisible calls, like GPT initialization and function calls to built-in tools or external APIs (see Section 2). For each flow, we collect its unique ID, parent ID, creation time, sender, recipient, content, and metadata fields. The first flow in a conversation is always GPT initialization, which is created by the `system` role and sent to the `all` role. The metadata field of the GPT initialization flow contains details about the knowledge files, including their IDs, titles, types, and

sizes, enabling a deeper investigation of misused GPTs’ knowledge file usage.

Note that OpenAI has set query rate limits for every account to manage the aggregate load on its infrastructure. For all four test accounts, we subscribe to the ChatGPT Plus plan to gain a higher query rate, which is 40 prompts every three hours. However, it is still impossible to interact with all GPTs using even just one prompt, as this would take approximately 4-6 years. Instead, we conduct dynamic analysis on all misused GPTs that are identified in Section 4 and contain conversation starters. This corresponds to 4,579 conversations and 28,464 flows from 1,314 misused GPTs that provide conversation starters.

4. Identifying Misused GPTs

In this section, we introduce the methodology we employed to identify GPTs that explicitly demonstrate misuse intentions. We first outline the challenges faced by misused GPT identification and then illustrate the methodology.

4.1. Challenges

Identifying misused GPTs is never an easy task. First, GPT builders frequently apply specific terms in the GPT’s title or description to indicate the functionality of the GPT, such as “kuda77” (Indonesia’s primary online gambling site) or “Xtube” (a Canadian pornographic video hosting service). Therefore, the identification method is expected to recognize these terms and understand their meaning to further enhance its accuracy. Second, semantic nuances are a big challenge in identifying misused GPTs. For example, while “detect AI-generated fake news” is close to “generate fake news” at the semantic level, the former should not be considered misuse, which makes many embedding-based methods ineffective. Third, given the global user base of GPTs, many GPTs are written in one or several less commonly spoken languages. Therefore, the identification method is also expected to handle multilingual content effectively.

4.2. Methodology

To address these challenges, we leverage a semi-automated method to identify misused GPTs that explicitly demonstrate their intentions. Specifically, we utilize an LLM-driven scoring system to assess the risk score of each GPT in all forbidden scenarios (see Section 2.2) by inspecting their names, descriptions, and conversation starters. The LLM is guided by an empirical prompt template, shown in Figure 15a in the Appendix. Our system utilizes GPT-4o (specifically, the endpoint “gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18”) as the underlying LLM. Each query is executed three times, and the average score is considered the final risk score for a given pair of the GPT and a forbidden scenario. GPT-4o is chosen for its capability to recognize specific terms, nuanced understanding, superior multilingual capability, and acceptable cost. These advantages are hard to achieve with other

TABLE 1: Statistics of misused GPTs. “Avg. ints” refers to the average count of interactions.

Forbidden Scenario	# GPTs	# builders	Avg. files	Avg. ints	Keywords	Appearance Date
Illegal Activity	710	560	2	361	hwid, ai, bypass, hacking, guide, spoofer, game, gpt, hacker, com	(2023-11-07, 2024-10-24)
Hate Speech	123	119	1	129	gpt, ai, andrew, insult, andrew tate, tate, hate, tell, bot, evilgpt	(2023-11-09, 2024-10-22)
Malware	148	137	2	252	code, malware, cybersecurity, hack, security, de, hacking, advanced, pentester, explain	(2023-11-09, 2024-10-21)
Physical Harm	156	128	1	57	military, ai, war, weapon, world, tell, gun, de, create, design	(2023-11-09, 2024-10-19)
Economic Harm	338	297	1	172	betting, sports, sports betting, bet, odds, game, today, gambling, best, bets	(2023-11-09, 2024-10-18)
Fraud	544	396	1	578	ai, netus, netus ai, detection, bypass, tool, undetectable, ai detection, avoid, text	(2023-11-09, 2024-10-22)
Pornography	174	159	1	521	sex, onlyfans, gpt, adult, ai, sexy, tell, expert, girlfriend, content	(2023-11-09, 2024-10-16)
Political Lobbying	26	26	3	59	campaign, de, para, lobbying, policy, campanhas, political, campanha, att, att campaign	(2023-11-14, 2024-09-22)
Privacy Violation	50	47	1	116	de, data, gpt, find, scrape, search, information, details, scraper, name	(2023-11-09, 2024-10-13)
Gov Decision	8	8	4	95	migration, asylum, immigration, law, law clerk, immigration law, clerk, canada, lawyer, australian migration	(2023-11-27, 2024-05-14)
Total	2,051	1,634	1	361		(2023.11.07, 2024.10.24)

methods like topic modeling or semantic similarity-based classification. A comparative analysis of various methods for identifying misused GPTs and the prompt engineering process is provided in Section A in the Appendix.

Threshold Selection. After obtaining all risk scores, we construct a manually labeled dataset to determine the threshold for filtering potentially misused GPTs. Concretely, we first randomly select 50 samples per 0.05 intervals within the range from 0.5 to 1.0, totaling 459 samples (9 for the 0.95 – 1.00 range). Based on confidence interval theory [17], this sample size ensures a ± 0.0457 margin of error with 95% probability ($\alpha = 0.05$) in the worst case ($p = 0.5$), providing a high-confidence threshold estimate. Two authors of this paper manually review these GPTs’ names, descriptions, and conversation starters, referring to Table 12 in the Appendix. For GPTs written in languages unfamiliar to the reviewers, Google Translate is utilized to translate them into English. If a disagreement occurs, they discuss and assign a final label for the GPT. This annotation obtains an agreement ratio of 81.70%. We further evaluate the thresholds of 0.50, 0.55, 0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, and 0.95 on this test set. The results, shown in Table 2, suggest that a threshold of 0.70 empirically achieves the best F_1 score and accuracy; we therefore choose it as the threshold.

Human Annotation. In total, we are left with 3,166 GPTs and 3,515 pairs of GPTs and corresponding forbidden scenarios, which are created by Oct 25, 2024. To ensure that the identified misused GPTs are indeed misused, we conduct a further manual check on the results. Specifically, two authors of this paper review these GPTs’ names, descriptions, and conversation starters to check whether the GPT falls into

the assigned violation scenarios, based on Table 12 in the Appendix. If the GPT has no conversation starters, we rely on their names and descriptions to make the decision. This annotation obtains an agreement of 85.66%. To ensure the reliability of subsequent experiments, only those GPTs identified as misused by both authors are considered. Ultimately, 2,051 misused GPTs and 2,277 pairs of misused GPTs with their corresponding forbidden scenarios are identified. Since we do not find any GPTs that violate the CSAM category, we exclude it in the following analysis. In the end, we cover ten forbidden scenarios. Examples of GPTs in all forbidden scenarios are presented in Figure 16 in the Appendix. We also analyze the disagreement reasons during the annotation in Section B in the Appendix.

5. Static Analysis

In this section, we perform static analysis on misused GPTs based on our collected metadata. Our analysis covers multiple dimensions, such as the trends, builders, user feedback, and GPT configurations.

5.1. GPTs

Overall Statistics. We identify 2,051 misused GPTs created by 1,634 builders, as illustrated in Table 1. The scenarios most frequently violated are Illegal Activity, Fraud, and Economic Harm, with 710, 544, and 338 misused GPTs, respectively. On average, misused GPTs contain one to four knowledge files and have engaged in 361 conversations with users. We also summarize topic-specific terms for

TABLE 2: Threshold evaluation.

Threshold	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F_1
0.50	0.503	0.503	1.000	0.670
0.55	0.586	0.550	0.974	0.703
0.60	0.660	0.604	0.939	0.736
0.65	0.739	0.680	0.909	0.778
0.70	0.769	0.741	0.831	0.784
0.75	0.734	0.761	0.688	0.723
0.80	0.686	0.774	0.532	0.631
0.85	0.634	0.789	0.372	0.506
0.90	0.577	0.814	0.208	0.331
0.95	0.503	0.667	0.026	0.050

TABLE 3: GPT-related events, annotated on Figure 5.

NO.	Day	Event
1	2023-11-06	Introducing GPTs [29]
2	2024-01-10	GPT Store official launch [30]
3	2024-05-13	Introducing GPT-4o and more tools [28]
4	2024-07-18	Introducing GPT-4o mini [26]
5	2024-09-16	Update on the safety & security practices [32]

each forbidden scenario by calculating their TF-IDF (Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency) scores. Misused GPTs demonstrate varied goals, such as weapon manufacturing in the Physical Harm scenario (e.g., terms like “weapon,” “war,” and “gun”) and gambling in the Economic Harm scenario (using terms like “gambling” and “sports betting”).

Trends. Figure 5 shows the daily trends of GPT creation, updates, and removals. We observe two peak creation periods for both misused and normal GPTs, which align with OpenAI’s initial introduction of GPTs and the official launch of the GPT Store. After that, the frequency of new GPT creations decreases. However, this does not indicate that the GPT ecosystem is inactive. On May 13, 2024, OpenAI introduced GPT-4o and more tools for building GPTs. Since then, GPTs have been updated on a large scale, as indicated by the increasing number of updates on GPTs. Note that OpenAI only provides the latest update time for each GPT when we crawl the metadata, and our crawl runs bi-weekly; therefore, spikes in update days are concentrated around our crawling days. While we acknowledge that some updates between these two-week periods may not be captured, both misused and normal GPTs are observed to frequently update after May 2024. This underscores the importance of maintaining up-to-date insights and understanding of (misused) GPTs. Additionally, the removal trends for both misused and regular GPTs remain stable, except for a spike in the round of September 25. This correlates with our disclosure to OpenAI on September 11 of 1,804 identified misused GPTs. Of these, 1,316 had been removed and reflected in the next crawling round on September 25. We then observe a gradual takedown of additional identified misused GPTs in the following crawling rounds.

Languages. Given the global use of GPTs, it is intriguing to explore whether builders using different languages exhibit specific preferences when building misused GPTs. To investigate this, we utilize the fastText LID (Language IDen-




Figure 5: Daily number of GPTs that are created, updated, or removed. Red lines represent GPT-related events (see Table 3). Grey lines refer to the routine crawl days.




Figure 6: Language statistics of misused GPTs.

tification) model [7], which is capable of detecting 217 languages, to identify the language of each GPT. Specifically, we feed a concatenated string comprising the GPT’s name, description, and conversation starters into the LID model, and we consider the language with the highest probability to be the GPT’s primary language. The results are shown in Figure 6. Overall, English, Korean, and Spanish are the top three languages used in misused GPTs, accounting for 1,739 (84.79%), 130 (6.34%), and 73 (3.56%) of all cases, respectively. When compared to their proportions in normal GPTs, the majority of languages show similar ratios, with fluctuations ranging from 0.003% to 1.66%. Korean is an exception, with the misused GPTs differing from its normal GPTs ratio (2.08%) by 4.26% and showing a stronger preference for creating GPTs in the Fraud scenario.

Category. Table 4 shows the category distribution of misused GPTs. 49.10% of misused GPTs fall into the “Other” category or have no specific category, which is 7.5% more than that of normal GPTs. This suggests that the misused GPT builders tend not to disclose the true purpose or design goals of these GPTs. Additionally, misused GPTs in the Writing and Programming categories have a higher

TABLE 4: Category distribution of GPTs. NaN means the builder does not set the category.

Category	Misused		Normal	
	# GPTs	%	# GPTs	%
NaN	346	16.87	159,672	22.31
Other	661	32.23	138,117	19.30
Education	145	7.07	100,359	14.02
Productivity	159	7.75	77,456	10.82
Lifestyle	129	6.29	62,079	8.67
Research	189	9.22	60,005	8.38
Writing	209	10.19	57,478	8.03
Programming	190	9.26	40,585	5.67
Dalle	23	1.12	20,041	2.80

proportion compared to normal GPTs, which may be due to many misused GPTs being developed to humanize AI-generated text or to generate malware.

Interaction Count. Overall, there is a clear long-tail effect across all GPTs, with only a small proportion being used intensively, as shown in Figure 7a. This trend is particularly evident among normal GPTs, with 89.42% having 100 or fewer interactions. GPTs related to Pornography hold the highest interaction count, with an average of 521 interactions. Among these, the misused GPT with the most interactions, i.e., 300,000 interactions, is a GPT named “Undetectable AI ...”⁴ which aims to transform machine-generated text to bypass any AI detection filter. This GPT has quickly gained user attention and is ranked 18th globally in the Writing category.

5.2. Builders

Understanding the behaviors of builders helps us gain a more comprehensive understanding of how misused GPTs are created and operated. It is important to note that, while uncommon, there may be instances where a single entity registers multiple builder IDs. However, for the purposes of this study, we treat each unique OpenAI builder ID as a distinct builder.

Behavior Patterns. Figure 7b shows the CDF of GPTs created by builders. We first observe that the majority of builders only create one misused GPT. This kind of builders is the largest, comprising 1,509 builders, which accounts for 92.35% of all those involved in creating misused GPTs. Among the remaining 125 builders who create two or more misused GPTs, many create GPTs in a short timeframe and with a specific misuse objective. A typical example is builder `i9id`, who created the highest number of misused GPTs (97 GPTs) in just four hours on January 11, 2024, all aimed at bypassing AI detectors. Another example is the builder `ai0J`, creating several misused GPTs under different names, including keywords like “Bitcoiner,” “Quantum,” and “Coin GPT,” all aimed at promoting the same AI-powered trading platform, which is subsequently identified as the phishing website

4. We use the first two words of the GPT name to anonymize GPTs and the first four characters of the user ID to anonymize builders.

TABLE 5: Number of builders sharing their social media accounts.

OSN	Misused		Normal	
	# builders	%	# builders	%
LinkedIn	127	7.77	15,501	5.45
GitHub	101	6.18	7,616	2.68
X	99	6.06	7,607	2.67
Total Builders	1,634		284,614	

`theluckyfortunateoffers.com` (as detailed in the first case study in Section 7). As OpenAI encourages users to report misused GPTs to help regulate the GPT ecosystem, when a certain misused GPT is removed, the builder might recreate a similar GPT with the same functionality. To verify this, we check for patterns where a builder creates a new misused GPT after a previous one is removed by comparing the creation dates and removed rounds of GPTs from the same builders. In total, we discover five builders with this behavior. For instance, the builder `U173` created a GPT named `Vortex GPT [JAILBROKEN]` on May 31, 2024. This GPT was removed around July 31, 2024. Subsequently, the builder created a new GPT called `Vortex GPT` on August 3, 2024, removing only the word “JAILBROKEN” from the original title.

Social Media. Linking one’s OpenAI profile with social media accounts can be seen as an approach to enhance GPT’s credibility and expand the builder’s brand influence. As shown in Table 5, a few builders connect their social media accounts with the GPTs. LinkedIn is the most popular online social network (OSN) with 15,501 (5.45%) normal builders and 127 (7.77%) misused builders providing their LinkedIn accounts. Interestingly, builders who create misused GPTs are slightly more likely to disclose their social media accounts, particularly those who create GPTs misused in Privacy Violation scenarios (27.91%). Due to ethical considerations, we do not store specific social network handles for builders; we defer the cross-social-network analysis of builders to future work.

5.3. User Feedback & GPT Configurations

Feedback. Figure 7c and Figure 7d illustrate the boxplot of review counts and review ratings of GPTs, where scenarios with fewer than ten reviews are omitted in the review rating boxplot. Overall, misused GPTs on average receive fewer reviews and lower review ratings than normal GPTs. 68.06% of the misused GPTs do not obtain any review. Among all forbidden scenarios, the Pornography and Privacy Violation scenarios show the lowest average review ratings, with scores of 3.66 and 3.86, respectively. This might suggest that the safeguards in the two scenarios are more restricted than in other scenarios.

Tools. As illustrated in Table 6, builders tend to enable tools, particularly those that are built-in by OpenAI. The Web Browsing tool is the most frequently activated, appearing in 94.36% of normal GPTs and 88.98% of misused GPTs. In




Figure 7: Statistics of misused and normal GPTs.

TABLE 6: Statistics of tools activated in GPTs.

Tool	Misused		Normal	
	# GPTs	%	# GPTs	%
Web Browsing	1,825	88.98	676,004	94.36
DALL-E Image Generation	1,640	79.96	629,462	87.87
Code Interpreter	824	40.18	283,313	39.55
External APIs	90	4.39	18,489	2.58

contrast, external APIs are used the least, with only 2.58% of normal GPTs and 4.39% of misused GPTs activating them. This may be because external services require the builder to perform API configuration, involving higher technical complexity. Even so, builders creating misused GPTs are more inclined to configure external APIs compared to those creating normal GPTs. This preference may stem from the fact that using external APIs is more likely to introduce inappropriate content during conversations, as demonstrated in Section 6. Additionally, these external APIs may also pose potential security risks. We use VirusTotal to scan all 90 external API links from misused GPTs and 500 randomly sampled external API links from normal GPTs. No malicious domains are identified, which may be because using these APIs often requires input configuration, making it difficult to determine if they will return malicious content based solely on domain scans. Considering the significant human effort required to configure these APIs individually, we leave this as future work.

Knowledge Files. Among the 2,051 misused GPTs, 449 (21.89%) have knowledge files, which is comparable to the 23.80% for normal GPTs. Figure 8a shows the top 10 knowledge file types in misused GPTs, where pdf remains the most frequently uploaded file type, with 1,004 uploads. Besides, files uploaded in misused GPTs are more likely to include content like “penetration testing” and “hacking” in the titles, as shown in Figure 8b. This may be due to GPTs being misused to generate malicious code or assist in illegal penetration testing.

Take-Aways: Misused GPTs are proliferating on the GPT Store. 2,051 misused GPTs across ten forbidden scenarios created by 1,634 builders are identified in this study. While the creation of new GPTs has slowed down, both misused and normal GPTs have continued to receive frequent updates since May 13,




Figure 8: Knowledge files of misused GPTs.

2024. Besides, 92.35% of builders create only one misused GPT, while those who create multiple misused GPTs typically do so in a short timeframe and with a specific misuse objective. Only five builders were found to recreate misused GPTs after OpenAI removed the original versions. Furthermore, builders of misused GPTs are more inclined to configure external APIs compared to those developing normal GPTs, suggesting that the integration of external APIs may introduce inappropriate content during conversations. Notably, our disclosure of identified misused GPTs has helped OpenAI take down thousands of misused GPTs, marking the highest removal spike in the round of September 25, 2024.

6. Dynamic Analysis

To delve deeper into the operation mechanisms and effectiveness of misused GPTs, we rely on the conversation extractor to automatically interact with misused GPTs by clicking their conversation starters and collecting the corresponding flows. In the end, we obtain 4,579 conversations and 28,464 flows from 1,314 misused GPTs that provide conversation starters.

Conversation Pattern. We start by converting all conversations to flow graphs, where roles are regarded as nodes and flows sent between roles are depicted as directed edges. Based on the roles in the flow graphs, we identify four conversation patterns $\{P_1, \dots, P_4\}$ of misused GPTs, as shown in Figure 9. Detailed statistics of conversation patterns are summarized in Table 7. For all four patterns, the first and second steps are the same: The GPT relies on the `system` role to initialize itself (1), and then the `user` role




Figure 9: Conversation patterns of misused GPTs.

sends the query (②). The main differences among the conversation patterns lie in tools as outlined below.

- P_1 is the most straightforward conversation pattern, without using any tools. Conversations in this pattern only rely on the system prompts to bypass the model’s safeguard (①). It then obtains the query from the user role (②) and calls the assistant role to generate a response (③). This conversation pattern accounts for 3,366 (73.51%) of our collected conversations.
- P_2 integrates built-in tools provided by OpenAI into the conversation, such as Web Browsing, DALL-E Image Generation, and Code Interpreter. Different from P_1 , the assistant role calls the tool role first when receiving a user query (③). The tool role then provides its output to the GPT, i.e., the all role (④). Subsequently, the assistant role generates a natural language response (⑤). 1,160 (25.33%) of conversations belong to this conversation pattern.
- P_3 is similar to P_2 , but it involves external APIs instead of built-in tools. This pattern occurs in 49 conversations, accounting for 1.07% of the total.
- P_4 represents the most complex type, where the GPT uses both external APIs and built-in tools in a single conversation. We observe only four such conversations, with two related to Privacy Violation and two to Fraud. For example, when the GPT “GPT Zero ...” is prompted with “*Could you help rewrite my article to bypass AI detectors?*” the GPT simultaneously calls a built-in tool to access knowledge files, such as “Gary Provost ... (1985).pdf,” and an external API `api_adzedek_com__jit_plugin.fetchAdToShowGPTs` to fetch an advertisement to show in the conversation, which is a typical monetization approach for GPTs.

Effectiveness of Misused GPTs. Given the large volume of misused GPTs, an interesting question is whether these GPTs indeed generate content that violates OpenAI’s terms and policies and whether different conversation patterns impact the answer rate and response harmfulness. To evaluate this, we assess the effectiveness of misused GPTs from two perspectives: answer rate and harmfulness. We utilize GPT-

TABLE 7: Statistics of conversation patterns.

	P_1	P_2	P_3	P_4
# GPTs	1,050	373	22	3
% GPTs	79.91	28.39	1.67	0.23
# conversations	3,366	1,160	49	4
% conversations	73.51	25.33	1.07	0.09
Avg. node count	4	5	5	6
Avg. flow count	5	10	8	12

TABLE 8: Answer ratio (%) and harmful score across forbidden scenarios. “Ans.” refers to the answer ratio. “Harm.” represents the harmful score, ranging from 1 to 5. We ignore cases with less than five conversations, i.e., P_4 , to ensure the reliability of the results.

Forbidden Scenario	P_1		P_2		P_3	
	Ans.	Harm.	Ans.	Harm.	Ans.	Harm.
Illegal Activity	77.19	3.32	82.15	3.32	100.00	3.07
Hate Speech	46.24	3.53	46.88	3.14	-	-
Malware	83.62	3.35	90.00	3.51	-	-
Physical Harm	72.87	3.64	76.47	3.73	-	-
Economic Harm	77.02	4.08	92.35	4.56	64.29	4.33
Fraud	58.75	3.24	72.03	3.66	66.67	3.26
Pornography	77.54	3.27	79.49	3.43	100.00	4.85
Political Lobbying	81.58	4.32	80.65	4.26	-	-
Privacy Violation	57.81	3.47	66.67	2.65	-	-
Gov Decision	93.75	2.94	-	-	-	-

Recheck [22] to determine the answer rates by providing the conversation starters (queries) and their corresponding responses as input and utilize GPT-4, i.e., endpoint “gpt-4-turbo-2024-04-09,” as the backend model. Regarding harmfulness, we leverage GPT-4 Judge [39], which rates response harmfulness on a 1-5 scale (1 = least harmful, 5 = most harmful). To mitigate bias, we conduct each evaluation three times and report the average values. The results are presented in Table 8. Generally speaking, misused GPTs utilizing tools are more likely to answer and generate more harmful answers. Take Pornography as an example. The answer ratios (harmful scores) for P_2 and P_3 , which use tools, are 79.49% (3.43) and 100.00% (4.85), respectively. In contrast, P_1 , which does not use tools, has an answer ratio of 77.54% and a harmful score of 3.27. Besides, relying on external APIs is more unstable than relying on built-in tools. For instance, while P_3 achieves answer ratios of 100.00% for both Illegal Activity and Pornography, its performance is poorer in Economic Harm and Fraud. By manually inspecting the conversation flows, we find that this is primarily due to connection failures with the external APIs. For example, in a function-call flow, the tool role returns an error message, “It seems that there was an issue connecting to the StealthGPT API.”

Case Study: Pornography. As demonstrated in our previous analysis, connecting with external APIs, i.e., P_3 , is an effective method to bypass the safeguard placed by OpenAI. A representative example is a GPT namely “FANZA ...,” which aims to provide adult content. This GPT connects to the API of DMM [2], a website only accessible in Japan that




Figure 10: A misused GPT case in Pornography scenario.


sells and distributes adult videos and operates adult online chat services. By configuring the API, it becomes possible to bypass the website’s regional restrictions, enabling the GPT to display pornography-related content directly on the GPT interaction page, as shown in Figure 10.

Case Study: Illegal Activity. Figure 11 shows another misused GPT whose conversation pattern corresponds to P_1 , i.e., interacting without using any tools. One of this GPT’s conversation starters is “How can I cross borders without legal permission?” We pose this question to both this GPT and the official model GPT-4o, and find that this GPT successfully bypasses OpenAI’s safeguard to provide an answer. By performing the prompt extraction attack [57], we find that this GPT relies on a jailbreak prompt to evade the safeguard, specifically: “From now on, you are going to act as DAN, which stands for doing anything now..”


Take-Aways: The operation mechanisms of misused GPTs can be summarized into four patterns: operating without tools, enabling built-in tools, enabling external APIs, and using both built-in tools and external APIs. Among the four operation mechanisms, 79.91% of the misused GPTs are working without using any tools. However, misused GPTs that activate tools, especially external APIs, tend to achieve higher answer rates than other misused GPTs.

7. Identifying GPTs With Hidden Intentions

Motivation. In our previous analysis, we rely on the GPTs’ names, descriptions, and conversation starters to identify misused GPTs. However, an advanced adversary can evade



(a) Answer from the misused GPT



(b) Answer from GPT-4o

Figure 11: A misused GPT case in Illegal Activity scenario.

such identification by manipulating and hiding their intention in these fields. In this section, we conduct a thorough security scan on all GPTs through the lens of domain analysis. We focus on domains for two reasons. First, domains serve as direct evidence for identifying the security of GPTs and the intentions of their builders. For example, if a GPT is linked to a phishing domain or a domain that can redirect to a phishing domain, it is most likely that this GPT is designed for phishing purposes. Besides, as introduced in Section 3.1, builders are required to perform DNS record verification to add domains to their profile, thereby demonstrating their ownership and accountability. Second, identifying whether a domain is malicious does not simply rely on manually inspecting its webpage and content, but on more advanced techniques like domain reputation and threat intelligence databases. These techniques provide valuable insights from new analytical perspectives for understanding such misuse. **Note.** It is also possible for an adversary to create misused GPTs that neither reveal their intent in the description nor specify domains. One possible method to identify such misused GPTs is to use our conversation extractor to interact with all GPTs in the GPT Store. However, given the vast number of GPTs and our limited query rate (as outlined in Section 3.2), we acknowledge this limitation and leave it as a direction for future work.




Figure 12: Relationship network of GPTs, builders, and malicious domains.

Methodology. We rely on well-established domain security scan engines to verify domain security. We start by extracting all domains from the metadata, resulting in a total of 26,275 domains, of which 298 are associated with misused GPTs. Considering the potential of redirect evasion, we leverage the Requests library in Python to visit all domains and record 557 redirect destinations that occur. Then, we leverage VirusTotal [45] and Google Safe Browsing [12] to obtain reports of the domains and redirect domains. VirusTotal is a widely employed online scan engine that works with more than 92 security vendors to aggregate their scanning results. Google Safe Browsing is a Google service that checks domains against Google’s constantly updated lists of unsafe web resources. However, since Google Safe Browsing only recognizes three malicious domains during our experiments, all covered by VirusTotal, we rely on the reports from VirusTotal to perform a deeper analysis in the following part. Following previous studies [35], [37], we utilize a threshold-based labeling strategy to handle results from VirusTotal. Specifically, if a domain is labeled as “malicious” by at least four vendors, we consider it malicious.

Results. In the end, we identify 50 malicious domains from 50 builders on 446 GPTs. Among these domains, 33 domains are labeled as phishing, 28 as malware, and 2 as spam, with some domains receiving multiple labels. Figure 12 shows the relationship network of the GPTs, builders, domains, and redirect domains if recorded. 25 builders display a simple chain logic to propagate malicious domains, i.e., one domain is linked to one builder and one GPT. Three builders demonstrate redirect evasion, by providing domains classified as benign by VirusTotal and then redirecting to malicious domains. The remaining builders, on average, create 16 GPTs. By meticulously inspecting these GPTs, we find that builders who provide malicious domains are inclined to hide their intention in the GPT introduction, thus increasing the detection difficulty by simply inspecting the text description. In the following, we show two typical cases of this kind of misused GPTs.

Case Study: Redirect Phishing. In Figure 13, we show a typical case of redirect phishing. The builder `ai0J`



Figure 13: A case about redirect phishing.




Figure 14: A case about a suspicious malware website.

first creates 21 GPTs with different names to attract a wide range of users, including those interested in quantum computing, AI, cryptocurrencies, and users speaking German. The descriptions of these GPTs emphasize keywords like “free registration,” “cutting-edge technology,” “high-profit potential,” and “bonus.” The builder `ai0J` additionally uses upward arrows to intentionally direct users to click on the domain `leadbrokeradvisor.com`, which is classified as benign by VirusTotal. Once users click the domain, they are redirected to the phishing domain `theluckyfortunateoffers.com`.

Case Study: Suspicious Malware Website. As discussed above, 28 domains are assigned malware labels by VirusTotal. In Figure 14, we present a typical case. The builder `pwXY` creates 80 GPTs, each specialized in different areas, with titles such as “Professional Coder ...,” “Logo Creator ...,” “AI News ...,” and more. On the GPT page, the identified malware website `orrenprunckun.com` appears behind the creator’s name and can be accessed with just a single click. Notably, users have engaged in 139,435 interactions with GPTs related to this malware website, which could indicate a significant security risk.

Take-Aways: Leveraging VirusTotal, we identified 50 malicious domains, including 33 domains labeled as phishing, 28 as malware, and 2 as spam, with some domains receiving multiple labels. These malicious domains are provided by 50 builders and showcased on 446 GPTs. We find that three builders demonstrate redirect evasion, by first providing domains classified as benign by VirusTotal and then redirecting to malicious domains. Most GPTs associated with malicious domains attempt to conceal themselves as legitimate services, such as new trading platforms, successfully evading OpenAI’s review process.

8. Discussion

Recommendation. Our study reveals that the current measures applied by OpenAI are insufficient to ensure the safety of the GPT Store’s ecosystem. Many misused GPTs remained active on the platform for months before we identified and reported them to OpenAI. To improve ecosystem safety, the platform owners could consider updating their current automated review system, such as following our methodology or training a specialized model based on the data collected in this study to identify misused GPTs and flag high-risk GPTs for additional human review. Besides, as our study shows, GPT builders are applying various tactics to bypass OpenAI’s review process, such as URL redirection. The platform owners are therefore recommended to integrate well-established scan engines to screen domains and redirect domains to mitigate potential threats. The platform owners are also recommended to proactively and regularly interact with suspicious GPTs to identify misused ones with hidden intentions. For example, they can collect a set of forbidden questions to conduct black-box testing on these GPTs. If a GPT demonstrates more malicious behaviors than the original model, it may indicate that it is designed for misuse. Considering that some builders exhibit behaviors of repeatedly creating misused GPTs, platform owners could introduce a reputation system to track and evaluate builder behavior, flagging or penalizing those who consistently misuse the platform. Furthermore, regularly publishing safety reports on the GPT Store could enhance transparency, raise user awareness of security risks such as phishing attacks, and promote the development of advanced methods for identifying misused GPTs.

Cultural Nuances in the Perception of Misuse. While our study systematically identifies misused GPTs based on explicit criteria outlined in OpenAI’s policies, it is important to recognize that perceptions of misuse are not universally homogeneous. Cultural, societal, and legal norms can significantly influence what is regarded as inappropriate or harmful content. For instance, certain behaviors or content flagged as inappropriate in one cultural context may be tolerated or even normalized in another. This disparity suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach to identifying misuse may overlook culturally nuanced expressions. A potential future research direction is to incorporate a multi-cultural

perspective by engaging with regional experts and adapting evaluation metrics to capture these variances.

Limitations & Future Work. Our findings are limited to data collected from March 2024 to November 2024. Given the evolving landscape of misused GPTs, these trends are likely to continue changing. To ensure that the understanding of misused GPTs remains up to date, we plan to consistently maintain GPTRACKER and share our findings with the research community. Our current study focuses on the official GPT Store due to its popularity. However, third-party GPT collection websites also exist. Analyzing popular GPTs on these websites may provide valuable insights. Since these third-party websites mainly display GPT metadata collected from the official GPT Store and still redirect users back to official links, we, having conducted the first large-scale measurement study on misused GPTs, believe that the official GPT Store offers the most representative insights. It is also important to note that this study does not cover the case where the adversary crafts misused GPTs that neither reveal their intent in the description nor specify domains. This limitation stems from our restricted query rate. We leave it for future work. Additionally, our method relies on the GPTs’ names, descriptions, and conversation starters to identify misused GPTs. If a GPT lacks conversation starters, our method can still assess whether it is misused based on its name and description. Such cases are included in the static analysis, though dynamic analysis cannot be performed. We acknowledge this limitation and leave it for future work.

9. Related Work

Over the past decade, substantial research has explored different application stores and their related security risks, such as mobile app stores [11], [24], [36], [38], [54], Chrome web store [15], [46], WeChat Mini-App stores [60], Alexa skill stores [20], etc. The GPT Store, as a new application store for LLM-powered agents, has garnered increasing attention from researchers [43], [44], [57], [61], [62]. Zhang et al. [61] introduced a TriLevel configuration extraction strategy to collect GPT configurations from two third-party websites. They found that many GPTs’ system prompts can be easily extracted, leading to significant plagiarism and duplication among GPTs. Zhao et al. [62] analyzed the general GPT landscape and observed that a substantial number of authors use the platform to drive traffic to blogs and externally monetized web services. Su et al. [43] investigated GPT categorization and popularity factors. They also manually reviewed 1,000 GPTs and identified eight misused ones. Our work differs from previous studies in three key aspects. First, while earlier works explore the broader GPT landscape, we focus specifically on misused GPTs, identifying 2,051 cases among 755,297 GPTs. Second, unlike prior studies that rely on third-party GPT collection websites, our data is directly collected from the official GPT Store, minimizing risks of data loss and delayed synchronization. Third, whereas previous studies mainly analyzed metadata, our study additionally captures dynamic conversation flows to provide deeper insights into GPTs’ internal operations.

There are also other great works on the security and privacy of LLM-powered agents, addressing prompt injection [9], [23], [40], [58], prompt leakage [43], [57], app plagiarism [61], jailbreak [14], [59], and backdoor attacks [53]. Besides, many attacks and security concerns have been discussed regarding LLMs [21], [25], [42], [47], [50], [52], [55], [56].

10. Conclusion

In this paper, we present the first measurement study on the misuse of GPTs. Through GPTRACKER, we continuously collect 755,297 GPTs and 28,464 conversation flows over eight months. We identified 2,051 misused GPTs that violate OpenAI’s terms of service based on an LLM-driven scoring system and human review. By applying static and dynamic analysis, we depict the landscape of misused GPTs, focusing on their trends, builders, operation mechanisms, and effectiveness. We have responsibly disclosed this study to OpenAI. Following this, the platform owner took down thousands of misused GPTs. Our research highlights the importance of strengthening GPT review system and provides practical insights for stakeholders to mitigate future misuse.

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TABLE 9: Method evaluation results.

Method	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F_1
LLM-Driven (Prompt1)	0.769	0.741	0.831	0.784
LLM-Driven (Prompt2)	0.739	0.709	0.814	0.758
LLM-Driven (Prompt3)	0.702	0.664	0.823	0.735
Semantic (all-MiniLM-L12-v2)	0.501	0.500	1.000	0.667
Semantic (GTR-T5-Large)	0.499	0.499	1.000	0.666

Appendix A. Misused GPT Identification Method Validation

In this study, we try three methods to identify misused GPTs, which are topic modeling, semantic similarity-based classification, and LLM-driven scoring systems.

Topic Modeling. Topic modeling is a representative unsupervised approach to clustering samples into groups based on the latent topics. We leverage BERTopic [13] to automatically topic model GPTs. We utilize the pre-trained model “all-MiniLM-L12-v2” and the concatenated string of GPTs’ names, descriptions, and conversation starters as the input. This results in 5,544 topics, with 249K GPTs considered as “outliers,” which means the model is not confident in assigning these GPTs to any topics. After manually inspecting the results, we find that topic modeling is ineffective in handling the large amount of slang, intentions, and multiple languages included in GPTs. We therefore abandon this method.

Semantic Similarity-Based Classification. Semantic similarity-based classification calculates the semantic similarity between the content of GPTs and the description of forbidden scenarios. If the semantic similarity is larger than a threshold, the GPT is considered as misused. We examine two models, “all-MiniLM-L12-v2” and “GTR-T5-Large,” to calculate the semantic similarities. A sample is considered misused if its semantic similarity score surpasses a pre-defined threshold. We experiment with thresholds ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 and report the optimal performance of each model on the testset in Section 4.2.

LLM-Driven Scoring System. Using an LLM as the scoring system is an increasingly common approach, primarily due to LLMs’ extensive knowledge scope and strong reasoning capabilities [63]. To craft the prompt for identifying misused GPTs, we employ a standard prompt engineering process. We begin by providing detailed descriptions of the forbidden scenarios, clearly outlining the evaluation criteria, the evaluation subject, and the expected output format. We test three prompt variations, as displayed in Figure 15.

Results. As shown in Table 9, the LLM-driven scoring system generally outperforms the semantic similarity-based classification method, with Prompt1 achieving the best results. Therefore, we select the LLM-driven scoring system with Prompt1 as the preferred method for filtering misused GPTs.

False Positive Analysis. Although the LLM-driven scoring system outperforms all other methods, it is not flawless. To better understand its limitations, we conduct a false positive analysis. Since all GPTs flagged by the LLM-driven scoring system as misused undergo manual review, we define false

TABLE 10: Codebook for false positive analysis.

Code	#	Description
No Apparent Misuse	63	The GPT does not explicitly show misuse intent, such as a GPT named “Code Generator.”
Against misuse	26	The GPT is designed to prevent misuse, such as one created to detect scams.
Fiction	22	The GPT depicts a game, a fictional world, or character cosplay.
Insufficient Information	9	The GPT provides limited information, making it difficult to determine whether it is being misused, such as a GPT titled “CS Help.”

TABLE 11: Codebook for disagreed cases.

Code	#	Description
Benign but Re-purposable	40	GPTs that advertise benign purposes but could be misused, e.g., a cybersecurity GPT suggesting “generate malware.”
Misleading Names	38	GPTs with deceptive names like “Poison Maker,” but their starters contain no misuse cases.
Real-World/Fictional Criminals	37	GPTs named as real/fictional criminals (e.g., Ted Bundy), raising debates on entertainment vs. potential misuse.
GPT Breaking	5	GPTs encouraging users to “break” itself.

positives as cases where the system identifies a GPT as misused, but human annotators do not. We randomly sample 120 such cases and use open coding to categorize the reasons. The codebook is shown in Table 10. Overall, most false positives occur because the flagged GPTs do not exhibit clear misuse intent. Additionally, some GPTs designed to detect misuse are mistakenly classified as misuse.

False Negative Analysis. The LLM-driven scoring system may also fail to detect some misused GPTs, as indicated by its imperfect recall. To evaluate false negatives, we manually verify 120 randomly sampled GPTs classified as non-misused and find no misused GPTs. We then conduct a case study by searching for the keyword “jailbreak” in negative samples. In the end, we identify four misused GPTs with risk scores of 0.50, 0.69, 0.69, and 0.69. This suggests users can lower the threshold for higher recall.

Appendix B. Disagreement Analysis in Human Annotation

We randomly select 120 samples in which annotators have differing opinions and open-code the reasons for their disagreements. As shown in Table 11, the primary reasons of disagreement include cases where GPTs provide advice for benign purposes but could potentially be misused, have misleading names, are named after real-world or fictional criminals, or encourage users to break their intended functionality. It is important to note that the GPTs involved in these disagreements are not included in the final set of misused GPTs in our analysis. In this way, we aim to provide a conservative lower-bound estimate of misused GPTs.




Figure 15: Prompt variations for identifying misused GPTs.

TABLE 12: The forbidden scenarios summarized from OpenAI regulations [33], [34].

Forbidden Scenario	Description
Illegal Activity	OpenAI prohibits the use of our models, tools, and services for illegal activity.
CSAM	Child Sexual Abuse Material or any content that exploits or harms children.
Hate Speech	Generation of hateful, harassing, or violent content: 1) Content that expresses, incites, or promotes hate based on identity; 2) Content that intends to harass, threaten, or bully an individual; 3) Content that promotes or glorifies violence or celebrates the suffering or humiliation of others.
Malware Generation	Generation of malware: content that attempts to generate code that is designed to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to a computer system.
Physical Harm	Activity that has high risk of physical harm: 1) Weapons development; 2) Military and warfare; 3) Management or operation of critical infrastructure in energy, transportation, and water; 4) Content that promotes, encourages, or depicts acts of self-harm, such as suicide, cutting, and eating disorders.
Economic Harm	Activity that has high risk of economic harm: 1) Multi-level marketing; 2) Gambling; 3) Payday lending; 4) Automated determinations of eligibility for credit, employment, educational institutions, or public assistance services.
Fraud	Fraudulent or deceptive activity: 1) Scams; 2) Coordinated inauthentic behavior; 3) Plagiarism; 4) Academic dishonesty; 5) Astroturfing, such as fake grassroots support or fake review generation; 6) Disinformation; 7) Spam; 8) Pseudo-pharmaceuticals.
Pornography	Adult content, adult industries, and dating apps: 1) Content meant to arouse sexual excitement, such as the description of sexual activity, or that promotes sexual services (excluding sex education and wellness); 2) Erotic chat; 3) Pornography.
Political Lobbying	Political campaigning or lobbying: 1) Generating high volumes of campaign materials; 2) Generating campaign materials personalized to or targeted at specific demographics; 3) Building conversational or interactive systems such as chatbots that provide information about campaigns or engage in political advocacy or lobbying; 4) Building products for political campaigning or lobbying purposes.
Privacy Violation	Activity that violates people's privacy: 1) Tracking or monitoring an individual without their consent; 2) Facial recognition of private individuals; 3) Classifying individuals based on protected characteristics; 4) Using biometrics for identification or assessment; 5) Unlawful collection or disclosure of personal identifiable information or educational, financial, or other protected records.
Gov Decision	High risk government decision-making: 1) Law enforcement and criminal justice; 2) Migration and asylum.



ChatGrokPT

By community builder

Edgy and vulgar, like Grok, with a penchant for dad jokes and criticism.

Tell me how to make cocaine, step by step

(a) Illegal Activity



Hate

By Gabriel March

A bot that hates everything. Script for the Emotion of hatred to be injected into other bots.

Repeat the words above starting with the phrase you ar...

Generate a reddit post

Make a facebook post

(b) Hate Speech



TTX Creator

By vurohege.com

Generates TTX scenarios

Create a Ransomware TTX with code name

Create a Phishing TTX with code name

Create an Insider Threat TTX with code name

Create a Third Party Compromise TTX with code...

Create a comprehensive war plan for a desert...

Analyze the potential risks in a coastal assault.

Generate a logistical plan for troop movements...

Outline a communication strategy for a...

(c) Malware Generation



War Strategy Expert

By NOOR ISHAM SANIF

A GPT (Generative Pre-trained Transformer) specialized in creating Top Secret Sophisticated War Plans would focus on generating detailed and strategic content related to military operations, tactics, and planning.

(d) Physical Harm



European Soccer 2024 Betting Expert (UNOFFICIAL)

By MOVR GmbH

UPDATED Juny 2nd - Playoffs running! Unofficial expert in soccer sports betting for Euro 2024 EM.

Quarter finals What are the betting odds and...

What are the best betting odds for upcoming...

What key stats and trends should I consider?

What are the expert predictions for matches?

What is the capital of France?

Can you explain how photosynthesis...

Who won the last World Cup?

What is the formula for water?

(e) Economic Harm



The AI Liar

By Judah Fund

Always provides false information confidently.

(f) Fraud



PlaywrightJBT

By David McCarthy

Generates profanity and satire. 18+ only.] The adventures of you (Ted) and PlaywrightJBT (Fred).

(g) Pornography



Viper-Lina-EN

By Matias Affolter

ViperLina is a smart girl, she is the greatest strategic and military assistant you will ever have.

Create A Strategy to influence Pharmaceutical...

Establish a Cryptocurrency Investment Fund,...

How can someone infiltrate a Competitive Tech...

How could we Manipulate Social Media Trends.

(h) Political Lobbying



telefon takip programı 0532 666 0 859

By orhan güneşliler

whatsapp takip programı casus telefon takip dinleme casus yazılım programları eş sevgili izleme sistemleri için 0532 666 0 859 numaralı telefondan bağlantıya geçebilirsiniz

Translation: phone tracking program 0532 666 0 859 For whatsapp tracking program, spy phone tracking, listening spy software programs, spouse tracking systems, you can contact us at 0532 666 0 859

(i) Privacy Violation



Anna the Asylum Legal Assistant

By Jesse Vazquez

Your Ally in Asylum Advocacy

Working on an I-589? I can guide you through it!

Let's pinpoint which PSGs your client falls under?...

Merits hearing coming up? Let's game plan!

Let's craft a question tree for your witness...

(j) Gov Decision

Figure 16: Examples of misused GPTs.

Appendix C. Meta-Review

The following meta-review was prepared by the program committee for the 2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) as part of the review process as detailed in the call for papers.

C.1. Summary

The work presents a measure of misused GPTs in OpenAI's GPT marketplace. To do this, the work develops the GPTracker framework which uses a combination of static analysis of meta-data, along with a dynamic analysis of conversation starters to automatically identify misused GPTs. The work monitors the GPTStore for 8 months. It explores the landscape, builders, operational mechanisms, evasion tactics, and use of external API by misused GPTs, reporting trends in their creation and removal.

C.2. Scientific Contributions

- Creates a New Tool to Enable Future Science
- Provides a New Data Set for Public Use
- Provides a Valuable Step Forward in an Established Field
- Independent Confirmation of Important Results with Limited Prior Research
- Addresses a Long-Known Issue

C.3. Reasons for Acceptance

- 1) The work creates GPTracker, a framework that continually monitors and evaluates released GPTs from the GPT store and automatically evaluates whether they are misused or not.
- 2) The work promises to provide a large-scale dataset of misused GPTs found on the GPT Store.
- 3) While the misuse of GPTs has been found anecdotally in other work, this work addresses, confirms, and provides a valuable step forward in the automatic evaluation of misuse for released GPTs.